The Lee Jae-myung government announced on the 23rd an audit result stating that the relocation of the presidential office to Yongsan by the Yoon Suk-yeol government influenced the occurrence of the Itaewon crowd crush. The government had formed a “joint audit task force (TF)” to conduct the audit, following President Lee Jae-myung’s directive for a criminal investigation into the Itaewon tragedy after he met with families of victims from the Sewol Ferry, Itaewon, Muan passenger plane, and Osong underground roadway disasters on July 16.
The TF, which included the Public Service Management Office of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, the Audit Office of the Korean National Police Agency, and the Audit Office of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, held a briefing at the Government Complex Seoul on the morning of the same day. It stated, “The relocation of the presidential office to Yongsan led to increased security demands for managing nearby gatherings, resulting in no security personnel being deployed to the Itaewon area on the day of the tragedy.”
The TF pointed out, “The Yongsan Police Station did not establish an ‘Itaewon crowd management security plan’ for Halloween in 2022, unlike in 2020–2021. The command of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency and Yongsan Police Station prioritized security operations near the presidential office.” It noted that between May and October 2022, after the presidential office’s relocation to Yongsan, gatherings and protests in the Yongsan Police Station’s jurisdiction surged to 921 cases, 26.1 times higher than the 34 cases during the same period the previous year.
The TF specifically criticized that on October 27, 2022, two days before the tragedy, Kim Kwang-ho, then head of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, did not address the lack of personnel for crowd control during a report on Halloween security plans. On October 25, five days before the tragedy, Lee Im-jae, then chief of the Yongsan Police Station, only asked, “Why is there no security?” without instructing follow-up measures.
The TF also stated, “Despite multiple 112 reports warning of crushing risks, the police overlooked or mishandled them.” It added, “The Itaewon Police Substation received 11 reports of crushing risks before the tragedy and was ordered to dispatch personnel on-site, but only responded once, falsely recording the dispatch in the system.”
It further criticized delays in situational awareness and failure to provide timely on-site command by key officials, including the Yongsan Police Station chief and Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency head, which hindered an immediate response. The TF noted that although the accident occurred around 10:15 p.m. on October 29, 2022, the Yongsan Police Station chief arrived at the Itaewon Police Substation around 11:05 p.m. due to traffic congestion after nearby gatherings ended at 9:05 p.m. He stayed at the substation without inspecting the disaster site, causing a command vacuum. Regarding the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency head, it stated, “He became aware of the tragedy around 11:36 p.m. and arrived at the Itaewon Police Substation around 12:25 a.m. the next day, failing to report the situation to Yoon Hee-geun, then head of the Korean National Police Agency, until 1:19 a.m.”
The TF criticized the Yongsan District Office for its perfunctory inspections of restaurants in the Itaewon area, which may have contributed to the tragedy. It found, “The Yongsan District Office’s supervision of ‘general restaurants allowing dancing’ in Itaewon was conducted superficially, focusing on noise and vibration regulations, both at the time of the tragedy and currently.” It added, “Noise from nearby ‘general restaurants allowing dancing’ made communication between pedestrians difficult, potentially exacerbating the tragedy.”
The TF also condemned the failure of Yongsan District Office’s initial disaster reporting system. It stated, “Two of the five situation room staff were removing posters from a nearby wall, as instructed by the district mayor, at the time of the tragedy. The on-duty staff ignored a call from the Seoul Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Center about the crushing accident.” It further noted, “The lack of leadership from Park Hee-young, the Yongsan District Mayor, and other disaster management officials led to a failure in swiftly establishing an initial response system.”
The TF held police and Yongsan District Office officials accountable, criticizing inadequate disciplinary actions. Regarding the police, it stated, “The Korean National Police Agency’s Special Inspection Team conducted a special inspection from November 2022 to January 2023 and requested investigations into eight individuals, including the Yongsan Police Station chief. However, no official inspection report was produced, and poor handover between the Special Inspection Team and the Audit Office allowed responsible officials to retire without discipline.” Concerning Seoul City, it added, “The city decided to suspend disciplinary action against Yongsan District Office officials, who were requested to be disciplined on May 9, 2023, through internal reporting without formal procedures, resulting in their retirement without punishment.” For Yongsan District Office, it noted, “Administrative measures (disciplinary actions) have not been taken against seven individuals whose misconduct was confirmed by police investigations, even as of the audit date.”
The TF plans to demand measures against 62 individuals from the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, Yongsan Police Station, Yongsan District Office, and Seoul City Hall, who were found responsible for the tragedy or subsequent misconduct. Of these, 51 are police officers, and 11 are affiliated with Seoul City and Yongsan District.
Separately from the TF’s audit announcement, the Itaewon Special Act, enacted through bipartisan agreement, established a special investigation committee that has been probing the truth since last September. Since last July, a joint investigation team from the prosecution and police has also been conducting investigations. However, officials responsible for the tragedy, including former Yongsan Police Station chief Lee Im-jae, were indicted starting late 2022, and first-instance rulings were issued last year.