The Ugandan ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) parliamentary primaries in July have been tumultuous. In numerous areas, they were characterized by aggression, corruption, and electoral manipulation.Some applicants mentioned they spent Ush500 million ($135,000), while in NRM strongholds in western Uganda, where obtaining a nomination is a guaranteed path to the House, they paid as much as Ush1.5 billion ($400,000) to secure the party's nomination. These are significant sums in a nation where many individuals earn roughly Ush3 million ($800) annually.
During the general election scheduled for January 2026, it is anticipated that even greater amounts of money will be invested, and increased violence is expected.
This is not solely a Ugandan problem. In Kenya, party selection processes can be equally chaotic. During 2022, there were conflicts in Kisii and Nairobi, and in certain regions, ballot boxes were seized openly.
Numerous African nations share comparable situations. A key factor behind this is that politics frequently serves as the most reliable route to economic prosperity.
In the last thirty years, the majority of nations in East Africa have introduced economic changes. These measures have involved reducing trade barriers, privatizing public enterprises, decreasing government spending, and encouraging business ventures. However, the outcomes have varied.
Although certain areas such as telecommunications, banking, and real estate have experienced growth, the broader private sector continues to be modest, vulnerable, and inconsistent. Employment opportunities remain restricted. The majority of individuals are engaged in informal enterprises, earning minimal income.
Launching a business is challenging because of expensive administrative licensing processes, restricted access to loans, and inadequate infrastructure — it's not simple to become a logistics magnate in a nation with only two decent roads. It's even more difficult to develop a viable fintech in a market where half of your possible clients lack electricity or smartphones.
In contrast, politics is not only a far simpler method to earn money, but frequently the sole reliable option. Elected representatives get regular salaries, access to public contracts, a large four-wheel drive vehicle, a housing allowance, daily allowances, per diems for sneezing in Parliament, and a police escort (if the MP is appointed as a minister) when visiting their farm. These, however, are still legitimate payments and perks.
The actual motivations, nevertheless, lie in unethical political practices. A politician can recoup campaign expenses via contracts, purchasing agreements, and bribes if they are part of a "lucrative" parliamentary committee. Above all, politics provides security—a form of organized crime-like protection—from the issues that trouble private business owners.
This is an example of moral hazard. When individuals invest substantial sums to enter the political arena, they view it as a financial commitment — and behave accordingly once in power. The same methods employed to secure electoral victories — such as bribery, intimidation, and manipulation — frequently extend into their governance.
In Uganda, protests by the opposition are frequently prevented or dispersed. In numerous African elections, the practice of buying votes and intimidating voters is common. Those who criticize the government may be imprisoned, while supporters are often given land or business opportunities.
However, this model of bribery and bulldozing is starting to reach its boundaries. No one was forced into developing Rwanda's drone delivery system for blood and medical supplies.
Kenya's M-Pesa, a highly effective mobile financial service, emerged not from a minister's command but from engineers who were given the freedom to experiment and learn from their mistakes.
Kenya has emerged as Africa's top geothermal energy producer (and ranks sixth worldwide) due to the training and assistance provided to engineers.
Even Uganda's Kiira electric vehicle (EV) initiative, despite its challenges, demonstrates what can be achieved when the government allows knowledgeable individuals to experiment.
These examples show that you can't force a nerd to develop AI code capable of tracking and forecasting disease outbreaks such as cholera or Ebola. You can't intimidate a knowledgeable biochemist into developing drought-resistant seeds.
You can't imprison a software developer into creating a flood monitoring system. These individuals don't comply with your uniform or your authority. They simply walk away.
Museveni claims that election officials were detained due to misconduct during NRM primaries. Football serves as a relevant analogy. Many of Africa's leading footballers compete in Europe—due to better pay, more dependable systems, and opportunities to enhance their abilities. Nations such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal have numerous players in top leagues.
South Africa stands apart. A smaller number of its top athletes move overseas since local clubs provide fair wages and satisfactory working environments.
The message is evident: Individuals remain in places where the surroundings support them. Additionally, you require citizens who think that achieving success brings greater rewards than mere loyalty.
Imagine a young developer in Kampala aiming to create an application that assists farmers in selling their goods. Should taxes be steep, internet connections be sluggish, or the government halt online services during elections, he might abandon his efforts.
Or a meteorologist in Nairobi capable of accurately forecasting floods — but lacks the necessary funding as public resources are directed elsewhere. These are minor instances, yet they illustrate the larger narrative.
The success of Africa's future relies on establishing structures that promote knowledge, expertise, and equitable regulations. The traditional approach—gaining power via wealth and force, and leading through quick fixes—is ineffective in fostering "development." It undermines economic growth, squanders potential, and leads to a lack of confidence.
To achieve success, nations need to change their emphasis and establish structures that make purchasing elections less appealing, while making the construction of infrastructure more beneficial.
You can detain only a limited number of activists. You can conceal only so many scandals. Eventually, if you cannot motivate or compensate those who know how to operate drones, analyze data, or develop a malaria vaccine — you will remain dependent on importing soap and requesting donors for irrigation pipes.
Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, author, and the curator of the "Wall of Great Africans." X@cobbo3 Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (Syndigate.info).